Indiana Law Journal
Volume 11

Issue 2

Article 15

12-1935

Contracts-Enforcement of Negative Covenants by Injunction

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
(1935) "Contracts-Enforcement of Negative Covenants by Injunction," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 11 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 15.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol11/iss2/15

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

RECENT CASE NOTES
these rights are can be a cause of great inequity and should consequently be
avoided when possible.
The U. S. Supreme Court has substantiated the Massachusetts rule by holding that "stock dividends representing merely surplus profits transferred to
the capital account are not taxable to the shareholders as income within the
meaning of the Income Tax Law of 1913."37 The Uniform Principal and
Income Act has also adopted the Massachusetts rule. 3 8
The American Law Institute in its restatement of the Law of Trusts has
adopted the Pennsylvania rule, stating that "extraordinary dividends declared
during the period, whether in cash or in shares of the corporation or in other
property, are income to the extent and only to the extent that they are declared
out of earnings of the corporation which accrued subsequent to the creation
of the trust or the acquisition of the shares by the trustee." 39 Bogert, however,
in his recent work "Trusts and Trustees" states that "It is believed that the
trend of recent opinion has been that the Massachusetts rule is the more
desirable doctrine" and takes the position that from a practical point of view
the Massachusetts rule is the best of the three rules followed today. 4O The
fact that recent decisions in states where the question has come up for the
first time have expressly adopted the Massachusetts rule 4 l seems to support
his contention.
M. E. W.
CONTRACTS-ENFORCEMENT

OF NEGATIVE

COVENANTS

BY INJUNcTION.-De-

fendant, upon entering employment of plaintiff as head salesman and branch
manager, covenanted that he would not during the employment nor within
eighteen months thereafter, engage in the business of selling merchandise
handled by the plaintiff, either directly or indirectly, for himself or for others
in any territory in which he had worked. After working for more than three
years, the employment was terminated and a month later the defendant began
selling merchandise of the type described in the contract. Plaintiff brought
suit asking an injunction against the defendant restraining him from soliciting
or diverting plaintiff's patronage. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to
plaintiff's complaint, the plaintiff appeals. Held, under the facts stated, the
restraint would not be unreasonable or against public policy and the demurrer
of the defendant should have been overruled. Reversed. 1
Express negative covenants which restrict one person from competing with
another or from accepting employment with a competitor, may be analyzed
from the viewpoint of the subject-matter of the contract of which the covenants
are a part. The division according to this classification would be:
(1) Covenants pertaining to or included in contracts of employment.
(a) Covenants not to compete during the term of the employment.
(b) Covenants not to compete after the termination of the employment.
(2) Covenants not to compete which are ancillary to the sale of a business or
profession and its good will.
37Towne v. Eisner (1917), 245 U. S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158; Eisner v.
Macomber (1920), 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189.
38 Oregon Laws (1931), chap. 371, sec. 5.
39 Sec. 236, subhec. (b), p. 492.
40 Sec. 857, p. 2483.
41 In re Joy's Estate (1929), 247 Mich. 418, 225 N. W. 878; Hayes v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co. (1927), 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S. W. 91.
1 Grand Union Tea Co. v. Walker (1935), 195 N. E. 277 (Ind. Sup. Ct.).
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In distinguishing (la), covenants not to compete during the term of the
employment, from (lb.), covenants not to compete after the termination of the
employment, we find the essentials to secure equitable relief somewhat different.
To secure an injunction in the former situation there must be, in addition
to the showing of irreparable injury to the employer and the inadequacy of
relief at law, a showing that the services of the employee are of an extraordinary, peculiar or unique character, for which a substitute who will answer the
purpose of the contract cannot be easily secured. 2 In this type of covenant
there is ordinarily no question of illegality of the contract; it is merely the
breach of a contract. If the elements just referred to are present an injunction
will be granted but if not the complainant will be left to his legal remedy
of damages.
There is, however, no necessity for showing any "uniqueness" of the employee's services to secure relief by injunction in cases of the violation of
(ib), a covenant not to compete after termination of employment. Here the
courts balance the employer's need for protection to his business and its good
will against the necessity for the ex-employee to work and support himself
with a view to furthering the best interests of the public. In addition to the
standard requirements for equitable intervention, i.e., a showing of irreparable
damage and an inadequate remedy at law, to obtain an injunction restraining
the violation of this type of covenant it must be shown: (1) that the restraint
is reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer's business, (2) that
the restraint will not be unreasonably restrictive upon the rights of the
employee, and (3) not against public policy. If all these elements are shown
to the court's satisfaction the contract will be deemed not illegal and the
injunction will issue.3
In considering the distinctions between (lb) covenants within contracts
of employment not to compete after the termination of employment, and
(2) covenants not to compete which are ancillary to the sale of a business
or profession and its good will, we discover that while the transactions themselves or the subject-matters of the contracts are very different, yet in each
case, the acts covenanted against are quite similar. In both cases the object
is to guard against a threat of future competition. In spite of this similarity,
however, the courts are more reluctant to enforce the negative covenant in the
former situation than in the latter. 4 This tendency on the part of the courts
has been criticised and it has been asserted in cases and by text writers that no
distinction should exist between these two types. 5 The argument is that it is
equally lawful and proper to give the employer the protection necessary to his
2Lumley v. Wagner (1852), 42 English Reports 687; Philadelphia Ball
Club v. Lajoie (1902), 202 Pa. 210, 51 AtI. 973; Harry Rogers Theatrical
Enterprises v. Comstock (1928), 225 App. Div. Rep. 34, 232 N. Y. S. 1;
Tribune Association v. Simonds (N. J. Eq. 1918), 104 Atl. 386.
a Grand Union Tea Co. v. Walker (1935), 195 N. E. 277 (Ind.); Edgecomb
v. Edmonston (1926), 257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99; Eureka Laundry Co. v.
Long (1911), 146 Wis. 205, 131 N. W. 412.
4 Williston, Contracts (1920), sec. 1643; Carpenter, Validity of Contracts
Not to Compete (1928), 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 244, 267; Kinney v. Scarbrough Co.
(1912), 138 Ga. 77, 74 S. E. 772.
5 Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long (1911), 146 Wis. 205, 131 N. W. 412;
Williston, Contracts (1920), sec. 1643; A. Fink & Sons v. Goldberg (19 ),
101 N. J. Eq. 644, 139 Atl. 408.
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business in either case.6 On the other hand it has been forcefully maintained
that there is such a difference in the nature of the interests involved as to
justify this tendency on the part of the courts.7 In the one case an agreement
not to compete may be absolutely necessary that the vendee obtain the thing
sold. The covenant in such case becomes an essential part of the contract
of sale. On the other hand the employer is trying to protect something which
he already possesses. In so far as this is being done merely to stifle competition, it would seem invalid as against public policy. Thus it would stem inat
where the employee has little or no opportunity for becoming acquainted with
the employer's customers, the necessity for protection of the business by injunction has been reduced to the vanishing point. 8 Of course disclosure of
trade secrets and the use of a written list of customers' names presents a
totally different problem and is quite universally the subject of equitable intervention.0
Notwithstanding the inherent differences it is not suggested that
there should be a different rule or formula applied in these cases, but that
the courts do, and properly should, consider the differences in situation of
the parties, the interest sought to be protected, and the agreements involved,
in the application of the rule. It is, after all, a rule of discretion and the
above are quite proper for consideration in the exercise of such discretion.
As the court states in the opinion, and so far as this writer has been able
to determine, this is the first time the question of a covenant not to compete
after termination of employment which is embodied in an employment contract
has been decided by an Indiana court. There are, however, cases relative
to restrictive covenants ancillary to the sale of a business or profession. The
courts of Indiana seem committed to the proposition that, where there is an
express covenant not to compete which is ancillary to the sale of a business
or profession, injunctive relief will be given where there is a threat of future
irreparable injury to the plaintiff and damages are inadequate or impossible
of accurate ascertainment or the defendant is insolvent.1 6
Since the best
authority holds that there is such a close analogy between these two types
of restrictive covenants, the present case is apparently in line with the existing
law in Indiana.
In the determination of whether the injunction will be granted, i. e., whether
the essential elements as suggested have been complied with, the courts will
scrutinize: (1) the territorial limitations of the restrictive covenant, (2) the
extent of time for which it is to operate, (3) whether the employer might not
have adequate protection by an action at law for damages.1 1
6 Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long (1911), 146 Wis. 205, 131 N. W. 412.
I Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete (1928), 76 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 244, 268.
8 Sternberg v. O'Brien (1891), 48 N. J. Eq. 370, 22 At. 348; Bowler v.
Lovegrove (1921), 1 Ch. (Eng.) 642; Morris v. Saxelby (1916), 1 A. C.
(Eng.) 700; Menter Co. v. Brock (1920), 147 Minn. 407, 180 N. W. 553.
9 32 C. J. 156, sec. 211; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (1919, 4th ed.), sec.
1689; Westervelt v. National Paper & Supply Co. (1900), 154 Ind. 673, 57
N. E. 552.
1OBaker v. Pottmeyer (1895), 75 Ind. 451; Pickett v. Green (1889), 120
Ind. 584, 22 N. E. 737; Beatty v. Coble (1895), 142 Ind. 329, 41 N. E. 590;
O'Neil v. Hines (1896), 145 Ind. 32, 43 N. E. 946.
liPomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (1919, 4th ed.), sec. 1716; 32 C. J. 220,
sec. 339; 67 A. L. R. 1003; Duerling v. City Baking Co. (1928), 155 Md. 280,
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The rules laid down in the older cases as to what territorial limits were in
restraint of trade seem to have been abandoned to a large extent. The test
usually applied in the later cases is whether the territory is greater in extent
than that which is reasonably necessary to adequately protect the business. 1 2
Since the territory in the case under scrutiny was limited to the counties in
which the defendant had worked, the territory embraced was obviously
reasonable.
The question of time is also decided by the rule of reasonableness. If the
time provided in the contract is longer than is reasonably necessary to enable
the employer to secure his interests from the competition of his former
employee, the covenant becomes unduly restrictive of the employe's rights and
the courts may refuse to enforce it for that reason. Whether the time is
reasonable depends entirely upon the particular circumstance of the case.
Many cases, quite similar in facts to the instant case, have enforced restrictions
of a more limited time. 1 3 There are numerous other cases, quite similar
as to facts, however, where the time restriction was much longer.14
It might be argued that the injury to the plaintiff's business caused by the
defendant's competition could be rather accurately measured and so the injunctive remedy need not be resorted to. However, if an opposite result were
reached, any competitor in a business such as this might induce a particularly
successful or popular salesman to leave his employer and enter the employment
of the competitor. This would enable the competitor to benefit from the
expenses incurred in training the salesman and at the same time not give the
former employer opportunity to protect his business in case of such contingency.
H. S. C.

BANKS AND

BANKING-PRIORITY

OF PUBLIC FUND

DEPosrrs IN INSOLVENT

BANK.-Wells County Bank qualified as a public depository and therein were
deposited state funds derived from sale of automobile license plates. Upon the
insolvency of the bank, the state claims a preference to these funds over other
creditors. The court held that the state had no preference, the court settling
the question as to whether a claim due to the state, by reason of its sovereignty,
is entitled to a preference over all other creditors by referring to a case
previously decided in Indiana; the state, however, was given preference on
grounds not pertinent to the question here discussed.1
141 At. 542; Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long (1911), 146 Wis. 205, 131 N. W.
412; 2 Samuels Stores, Inc. v. Abrams (1919), 94 Conn. 248, 108 At. 541.
1 Kinney v. Scarbrough Co. (1912), 138 Ga. 77, 74 S. E. 772; 9 A. L. R.
1473; 1 Page, Contract, sec. 376-379.
13 Duerling v. City Baking Co. (1928), 155 Md. 280, 141 At. 542 (3
months); A. Fink & Sons v. Goldberg (19 ), 101 N. J. Eq. 544, 139 At.
408 (1 year-clothing business); Axelson v. Columbine Laundry Co. (1927),
81 Colo. 254, 254 Pac. 990 (6 months).
14 Oak Cliff Ice Delivery Co. v. Peterson (1927, Tex. Civ. App.), 300
S. W. 107, (3 years-within 5 squares of routes upon which employee had
worked); Granger v. Craven (1924), 159 Minn. 296, 199 N. W. 10 (3 yearswithin a town of 20,000 and 20 miles thereof); Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long
(1911), 146 Wis. 205, 131 N. W. 412 (2 years).
1 State ex rel. Symons, Bank Commissioner v. Wells County Bank et al.
(1935), 196 N. E. 873 (Ind.).

